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Abstract
Organizations are making substantial investments in information security to reduce the risk presented by vulnerabilities in
their information technology (IT) infrastructure. However, each security technology only addresses specific vulnerabilities and
potentially creates additional vulnerabilities. The objective of this research is to present and evaluate a Genetic Algorithm (GA)-
based approach enabling organizations to choose the minimal-cost security profile providing the maximal vulnerability
coverage. This approach is compared to an enumerative approach for a given test set. The GA-based approach provides
favorable results, eventually leading to improved tools for supporting information security investment decisions.
D 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Information technology (IT) infrastructure has
evolved into a critical strategy-enabling and support-
ing resource for organizations. The IT infrastructure
and information systems, which are so powerful in
creating and disseminating knowledge throughout
organizations, also possess weaknesses or vulnerabil-
ities. These vulnerabilities range from allowing
unauthorized access to the data and information stored
within such systems to the full-scale destruction of an
organizations infrastructure. Entities such as hackers,
terrorists, disgruntled employees and business com-
petitors are on the lookout for any vulnerability in the
information systems of organizations and may seek to
exploit found weaknesses for psychological, political
or economic advantage. These entities pose a serious
threat to organizational information systems and the
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often result in negative financial and other repercus-
sions for the affected organizations.
Organizations attempt to prevent unauthorized
access and other harm to their systems by using
security technologies that address known vulnerabil-
ities in their systems. We refer to the organizations
collection or portfolio of security technologies used to
protect against vulnerabilities as the security profile.
However, any given security technology addresses
only specific vulnerabilities and could possibly create
additional vulnerabilities. It is worth mentioning that
the security profile can only reduce the risk of a
particular vulnerability from being exploited. How-
ever, for the purposes of this research we assume that if
a known vulnerability is covered by a particular
security technology, the risk of that vulnerability being
exploited is close to zero. Additionally, organizations
also must take into account the cost of using each
security technology. Therefore, it is usually a difficult
decision for organizations to create and manage a
security profile that addresses as much vulnerability as
possible while minimizing the total cost of the profile.
This paper provides an innovative decision-making
approach to selecting the appropriate security tech-
nologies to address the vulnerabilities in the system.
The approach provides insights to management for
managing security risks. This paper demonstrates a
technique that could be incorporated into decision
support software tools that provide recommendations
for choosing the best combination of security solutions
that would minimize the risk for the organization.
To facilitate the above decision, we present and
evaluate a Genetic Algorithm (GA)-based approach
that improves the organizations ability to choose a
minimal cost security profile providing maximal
vulnerability coverage. We then compare the GA
approach to an enumerative approach of evaluating all
possible security profiles for a given set of test
problems. We perform these evaluations for several
combinations and sizes of matrices of vulnerabilities
and security profiles.
The remainder of the paper is organized as
follows: Section 2 describes relevant background on
GAs and how they have been used to address similar
problems in the past. Section 3 presents our research
definitions of vulnerabilities and security technologies
and the method used to match vulnerabilities to
specific security technologies. Section 4 contains our
model of the problem and Section 5 details the
experimental design. Results are reported in Section
6 and conclusions and future directions are given in
Section 7.
2. Genetic algorithms for multi-objective
optimization problems
The problem of matching vulnerabilities to security
technologies can be characterized as multi-objective
since we are trying to create security profiles to
achieve two objectives: minimize the exposed vulne-
rabilities of an organization and minimize the cost of
the security technologies used to address the vulne-
rabilities. As will be discussed later in this paper, such
multi-objective problems are typically difficult to
solve without the use of heuristics. As an example
of such a heuristic, genetic algorithm has successfully
been used in search, single-objective optimization and
machine learning. A general description of the genetic
algorithm and how it can be designed and imple-
mented for solving single-criterion optimization
problems appears in [5]. Researchers have since
developed techniques for applying GAs to multi-
objective problems. A survey of various GA-based
techniques for solving multi-objective optimization
problems is presented in [3]. The first approach
involved combining multiple objectives into one
objective using addition, multiplication or any other
combination of arithmetical operations. It was argued
that if the combination of objectives is possible, this
is not only one of the simplest approaches but also
one of the most efficient ones [3].
Aweighted combination of fitness functions to add
or subtract values during the schedule evaluation of a
resource scheduler, depending on whether or not the
constraints were violated was used in [12]. [7,14] also
use weighted combination of objectives to address
multi-objective problems. Goal programming was
developed in [2,6] where decision makers have to
assign targets or goals that they wish to achieve for
each objective. [10,13] have used goal programming in
conjunction with genetic algorithms to solve multi-
objective problems. These values are incorporated into
the problem as additional constraints and the objective
function tries to minimize the absolute deviations from
M. Gupta et al. / Decision Support Systems 41 (2006) 592603 593the targets to the objectives. An e-constraint approach
that optimizes one objective function while consider-
ing other objective functions as constraints bound by
some allowable levels of ei was described in [9] and
used in [8].
In this paper, we utilize the weighted sum of
objectives technique, used in [12] to combine the
conflicting objectives of minimizing the security
technology costs of addressing vulnerabilities and
minimizing the number of uncovered vulnerabilities
after implementation of security technologies. The
problem with this approach is that it requires some
information regarding the range of weights [3].
However, in our problem, a good estimate of the
weights of the objectives can be made based on the
type and preferences of the organization. Organiza-
tions such as financial institutions, for which covering
vulnerabilities is critical, will put more emphasis on
maximizing the number of vulnerabilities covered,
while organizations whose security requirements are
not as stringent might wish to minimize the cost of
security while still maintaining an adequate security
profile.
3. Definition of vulnerabilities and securities
Organizational information systems and their
underlying IT infrastructure contain vulnerabilities
that can be exploited by various entities. Organizations
utilize security technologies to reduce the risk of
damage presented by these vulnerabilities. A RAND
report [1] identifies a set of generic vulnerabilities
potentially present in most organizational information
systems and their supporting infrastructures. The
report provides a generic set of vulnerabilities rather
than specific bugs or weaknesses in information
system. By utilizing a generic set of vulnerabilities,
the problem of novel and previously unheard-of threats
can be addressed. For example, a new type of Internet-
based attack can be handled using the generic frame-
work, whereas it would be outside a very specific list
of known vulnerabilities. However, the generic
approach can be easily extended to a more specific
set of vulnerabilities and security technologies. These
vulnerabilities are classified into seven categories.
Organizations can then map their information systems
and infrastructure to these vulnerabilities to provide an
initial assessment of the state of risk to their systems.
This list of vulnerabilities and the variables we used to
represent them in our model is presented in Table 1.
Organizations address the vulnerabilities described
above in several ways, including changing business
processes, employee awareness program and investing
in security technologies. Security technologies reduce
the vulnerabilities, identify attacks and breaches and
react to these attacks and breaches. Each security
technology addresses certain vulnerabilities directly
by design; they reduce certain other vulnerabilities
indirectly as a second order effect. However, security
technologies can also directly or indirectly create
certain other vulnerabilities in the system. We present
the generic security technologies described in [1] and
their variable representation in our model in Table 2.
These generic security technologies are implemented
in the context of the organizations systems using
actual security technologies. Similar classifications
can be found in a recent NIST report [11].
Table 1
Technology vulnerabilities
Category Vulnerability Representation
Inherent Design/
Architecture
Uniqueness v1
Singularity v2
Centralization v3
Separability v4
Homogeneity v5
Behavioral
Complexity
Sensitivity v6
Predictability v7
Adaptation and
Manipulation
Rigidity v8
Malleability v9
Gullibility v10
Operation/
Configuration
Capacity Limits v11
Lack of
Recoverability
v12
Lack of
Self-awareness
v13
Difficulty of
Management
v14
Complacency/
Co-optability
v15
Indirect/Nonphysical
Exposure
Electronic
Accessibility
v16
Transparency v17
Direct/Physical
Exposure
Physical
Accessibility
v18
Electromagnetic
Susceptibility
v19
Supporting Facilities/
Infrastructures
Dependency v20
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some of these vulnerabilities either fully or partially
and creates some vulnerability either directly or
indirectly. We make a simplifying assumption that if
a technology partially covers a vulnerability or
indirectly creates a vulnerability, the scope is uni-
form. In other words, we do not distinguish how
severe or mild the value of the variable is. The
mapping of these security technologies to vulner-
abilities is presented in Table 3 [1]. The organization
looking to cover its vulnerabilities by investing in
security technologies has two major goals:
(1) Minimize the number of uncovered vulnera-
bilities after implementation of security
technologies.
(2) Minimize the cost of security to cover
vulnerabilities.
Achieving these two objectives is not easy since
the organizations have to constantly make trade-offs
between security costs and allowing some vulnerabi-
lities to be uncovered. Malicious agents can exploit
these uncovered vulnerabilities resulting in damages
to the organization. In the next section, we present the
model used to address this problem.
4. Research model
Wenowdemonstratethattheobjectiveofcoveringa
given set of vulnerabilities while minimizing security
costs and new vulnerabilities introduced as a result of
Table 2
Generic security technologies
Security Representation
Heterogeneity s1
Static Resource Allocation s2
Dynamic Resource Allocation s3
Redundancy s4
Resilience and Robustness s5
Rapid recovery and Reconstitution s6
Deception s7
Segmentation, Decentralization and Quarantine s8
Immunologic Identification s9
Self-organization and Collective Behavior s10
Personnel Management s11
Centralized Management of Information Resources s12
Threat/Warning Response Structure s13
Table 3
Matching security technologies to vulnerabilities
Security
s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 s11 s12 s13
Vulnerability v1 11 1 1  1
v 2 1 1 1 0.5 1 1 1 1
v3 0.5 0.5 1 1 1 1 1
v4 11 1 1  11
v 5 1  1 0.5 1 0.5
v6 1 1 0.5 1 11  1  1
v 711 1  11  0.5
v8 1 1 1 1 0.5
v9 1 1 1 0.5 0.5
v10 1 1 0.5
v11 1 0.5
v12 1 1 0.5 1 1 1 0.5 0.5
v13 1 0.5 0.5
v14 1 1 11  111 1 0.5
v15 0.5 0.5 111  0.5 1 1
v16 1 1 1 1 1 0.5 1
v17 11
v 18 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.5 1
v19 11 111 11 0 . 5
v 20 11 1 1 1 1  0.5 0.5
1, Security directly addresses vulnerability; 0.5, security indirectly addresses vulnerability; 0.5, security indirectly creates vulnerability; 1,
security directly creates vulnerability.
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of the well-known set-covering problem. Set-covering
isdefinedin[4]asafinitesetX andafamilyF ofsubsets
ofX,suchthateveryelementofX belongstoatleastone
subset in F. From an optimization standpoint, the
objective of a set-covering problem is to find the
minimal subset in F such that the selected subset
contains all the elements of X.We can also map the set-
covering problem into graphs. Imagine that each
element of the set X is represented by edges in the
graph and each of the vertices in the graph represents a
subset that contains some edges in the graph; i.e., the
edges are connected to the vertex. The objective of the
set-covering problem is now to find the minimum
number of vertices that cover all the edges in the graph.
The union of the subsets represented by each vertex
gives us the minimal subset that contains all the
elements of set X. It has been shown that the set-
covering problem is NP-complete [4].
The objective of the vulnerability-covering prob-
lem is to maximize the number of vulnerabilities
covered while minimizing the cost of security
technologies. However, the implementation of a
security technology might result in new vulnerabil-
ities. We use the term bresidualQ vulnerabilities to
describe these newly introduced vulnerabilities. The
problem now can be defined such that
If there exists a set of vulnerabilities V and a set of
security technologies S whose subsets cover some
elements in set V, but also result in creating some
subset of residual vulnerability set R,t h e nt h e
problem is to find the minimal subset of S that covers
all elements in V while having the smallest resulting
subset of R.
Representing the above problem through graphs, let
each unique vulnerability in set V be represented by a
colored edge. Each color represents a unique vulner-
ability. Let each vertex in the graph represent distinct
security technologies from the set S. Each security
technology that covers a vulnerability will have an
edge with that color on the vertex. If a vulnerability is
addressed only by one security technology, it is
represented by a self-edge. The residual set is
represented by unique vulnerability edges that are
created after the covering set is determined.
We now need to ensure that all vulnerabilities are
covered by finding a minimal set of vertices that cover
all unique-color edges. If we assume that any
selection of a subset of S results in the same subset
of set R, our problem is reduced to a set-covering
problem. But if the subset of S results in different
subsets of set R, our problem is more difficult to solve
than the set-covering problem. Therefore, we can
assume that our problem is NP-hard and cannot be
solved in polynomial time. From the algorithm
perspective, the time to find the solution increases
exponentially with the problem size, i.e., if the
number of security technologies increases, the time
to find the solution increases exponentially in the
number of security technologies. A heuristic techni-
que, such as a GA, must be used to search for a good
solution in such situations.
A GA was chosen as the heuristic solution to this
problem for several reasons. First, GAs have been
shown to perform well in similar situations. Second,
and perhaps more importantly, the genetic algorithm
structure is particularly well-suited to the features of
the problem being solved and therefore provides a
very natural representation of the problem.
We map the vulnerabilities, the security technolo-
gies and the residual vulnerabilities into genes or
strings of a GA. Let each vulnerability in the
vulnerability set be represented by a single bit in the
vulnerability gene. Thus, the vulnerability profile of a
firm is represented as,
V  vii  1...m  1
where, vi (i=1...m) represents individual vulnerability
and can take two values, 0 or 1. The value 0 signifies
that a particular vulnerability is not present in the
organizations information systems and the value 1
indicates the presence of the vulnerability. In this
research, m is set to 20, as there are 20 generic
vulnerabilities. For example, a vulnerability profile
d00001011011100010101T indicates that the vulner-
abilities: homogeneity, predictability, rigidity, gulli-
bility, capacity limits, lack of recoverability, electronic
accessibility, physical accessibility and dependency
are present.
Every vulnerability has a different significance for
each organization. Some vulnerabilities are more
critical than others and need to be addressed
immediately while others are not that critical. It may
be cost effective for the organization to address a
vulnerability indirectly instead of controlling it
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indicate varying significance to different vulnerabil-
ities. The weight for vulnerability vi is represented by
ai i=1m.The weights are assigned such that,
 m
i1
ai  1 2
To cover the vulnerabilities, organizations choose a
set of security technologies. Let each security
technology be represented by a single bit in the
security gene or string. Thus, the security of the firm
is represented as
S  sj

j  1...n

3
Each individual security technology can take two
values, 1 or 0. Similar to the vulnerability string, a 1
represents the presence of the security technology
represented by that bit and a 0 represents the absence
of that security technology. In this research, n is set to
13, as there are 13 generic security technologies. For
example, the security profile d1000000001001T indi-
cates the implementation of the following security
technologies: heterogeneity, self-organization and
collective behavior and threat/warning response struc-
ture. Each security technology has an associated cost.
We represent these costs as relative to each other. The
cost of any security si is represented by ci i=1...n.
The costs are assigned such that,
 n
i1
ci  1 4
Once a security technology is chosen, each
technology bit directly reduces one or more vulner-
abilities, indirectly reduces vulnerabilities, indirectly
creates some vulnerability or directly creates some
vulnerability. For 20 vulnerabilities and 13 security
technologies, the matching of the security technolo-
gies and vulnerabilities is presented in Table 3 [1].
Therefore, after a security technology is imple-
mented, we must reassess the vulnerabilities that
the organizations information systems still possess.
We call this the residual vulnerability portfolio. This
residual vulnerability exists either because of some
uncovered vulnerability, some partially covered
vulnerability or can be directly or indirectly created
by implementation of security technologies.
We represent the residual vulnerability portfolio
by a string with each bit representing the same
vulnerability described by the corresponding bit in
the vulnerability string. Each bit in residual vulner-
ability string also has the same weight as the
corresponding bit in the vulnerability. The residual
vulnerability of the firm is represented as
R  ri i  1...m  5
Each bit in the residual vulnerability string can have
three values: 1, 0.5 and 0. The value 1 represents
the presence of the particular vulnerability and the
value 0 represents the absence of that vulnerability.
The value 0.5 represents the presence of a partially
covered vulnerability or an indirectly created vulner-
ability. By partially covered vulnerability, we refer
to the fact that the technology was able to reduce
the spread of vulnerability and limited its damage,
however, the technology failed to address the
underlying cause of vulnerability. Thus, the tech-
nology managed to reduce the risk but did not
eliminate the risk. The coverage of vulnerabilities
by security technologies can be described by a
matrix tij i=1,...,m and j=1,...,n. The sample
matrix of tij is described in Table 3. The residual
vulnerability is determined based on the following
rules (These rules are exhaustive and are not
dependent on the order of rule application.):
(1) If vi=0 or 1 and any tij=1 for j/sj=1, then ri=0.
(2) If vi=0 and all tij=0 for j/sj=1, then ri=0.
(3) If vi=1 and all tij=0 for j/sj=1, then ri=1.
(4) If vi=0 and no tij=1 for j/sj=1 and any tij=1
for j/sj=1, then ri=1.
(5) If vi=0 and no tij=1 for j/sj=1 and any tij=0.5
for j/sj=1, then ri=0.5.
(6) If vi=1 and no tij=1 for j/sj=1 and any tij=0.5
for j/sj=1, then ri=0.5.
5. Experimental design
This section describes the specific implementation
of the GA used to search for a good solution to the
model presented above. We also present the details of
the experiments run to demonstrate the approach. The
same problem was then attempted using an enume-
M. Gupta et al. / Decision Support Systems 41 (2006) 592603 597rative approach to solve test problems of small size for
comparison purposes.
5.1. Specific GA Implementation
Organizations have two major objectives for
managing their information security investments:
(1) Choose a security combination that maximizes
the coverage of vulnerabilities or in other words
minimizes the weighted residual vulnerability.
This objective can be represented as
Min
s
 m
i1
airi 6
(2) Choose a security combination that minimizes
the costs to the firm. This objective can be
represented as
Min
s
 n
j1
cjsj 7
The fitness function for learning the security
profiles combines both objective functions into one.
The fitness function for any security combination S
k is
described as
F  a
 m
i1
airi  b
 n
j1
cjsj 8
where
a  b  1 and abV1
a and b are non-negative and represent the
preferences of the organizations. Some organizations
wish to cover as many of the vulnerabilities as
possible. For these organizations, addressing these
vulnerabilities is more important than paying an extra
price for security technologies. This preference can be
implemented by choosing aNb. For other organiza-
tions, the security budget is quite limited so they try to
minimize the cost of security while covering most of
the vulnerabilities. This case can be represented by
choosing abb.
We use a simple GA, similar to [5], including the
operations of selection, crossover and mutation. We
startwitharandompopulationofsecurityprofilesinthe
initial generation. Anelitistselection strategyisusedto
seed the next generation. The strings are sorted in
descending order of their fitness. A certain percentage
of the best security profiles are automatically copied
(inherited) into the next generation. The remaining
strings in the previous generation are selected for the
next generation using stochastic selection withreplace-
ment until the full population size is reached. The
probability of a security profile getting selected is
proportional to the value of its fitness function. This
processisundertakenforpairsofstrings.Onceapairof
strings has been selected, a weighted coin is tossed to
determine if they will undergo a single-point crossover
operation. If they are chosen to crossover, the pair of
strings will exchange bits after a preset crossover
position. After the crossover operation is completed,
thepopulationundergoesmutationwhereeachbitinall
security profiles is toggled according to a pre-defined
mutation probability. The above operations are
repeated until the best solution does not improve for a
certain number of generations.
5.2. Simulation experiment design
A set of 25 random vulnerability scenarios was
created for testing the performance of the GA. We
compare the GA approach to an enumerative or
exhaustive search (which we call bBrute ForceQ (BF))
approach to compare the efficiency and efficacy of the
GA approach for problems of small size. We also
examine different sizes of problems (in terms of
numbers of vulnerabilities and security technologies)
to examine the scalability of the GA approach. The
resultsofthesesimulationexperimentsandadiscussion
of these results are provided in the next section.
6. Results
For the first set of experiments, we tested 25
random vulnerability combinations and searched for
the optimal security portfolio using both the GA
approach as well as a BF search. We assigned random
weights to each vulnerability and security technology.
We assumed that organizations consider covering the
vulnerabilities and the cost of security to be equal and
assign the same weight to these parameters (a=b). The
results of the first set of experiments are presented in
Table 4.
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the GA-based approach was able to find the best
solution for all but 1 of 25 test cases that we
analyzed. Not only did the GA-based approach give
us the right solution, the execution time (CPU time
for finding the solution) for the algorithm was
much faster than the exhaustive BF approach. The
GA-based approach performed consistently better
than the BF technique. We carried out the analysis
for 20-bit vulnerabilities and 13-bit security pro-
files. These vulnerability and security profiles
matched with the classification of vulnerabilities
and security technologies provided in [1]. Table 5
presents the best security profiles for actual
vulnerabilities for some of the above results.
In the section above, we demonstrated the
effectiveness of the GA-based approach of matching
security technologies and vulnerabilities for a prob-
lem size of 20 vulnerabilities and 13 security
technologies. However, it is much more realistic to
have other possible combinations of vulnerabilities
and security technologies. In this section, we analyze
the performance of the GA-approach based on the
problem size.
Table 4
GA performance
Vulnerability GA solution BF solution GA
fitness
BF
fitness
%
Error
GA
time
(ms)
BF
time
(ms)
GA
faster by
factor of
00001011011100010101 0000000101000 0000000101000 0.1314 0.1314 0.00 220 420 1.91
00110001000010011000 0000000001011 0000000001011 0.1152 0.1152 0.00 240 360 1.50
01111110011101011110 1000000001001 1000000001001 0.1322 0.1322 0.00 180 360 2.00
11111101000100011110 1000000001001 1000000001001 0.1055 0.1055 0.00 150 370 2.47
11101011111010111110 1000000001011 1000000001011 0.1470 0.1470 0.00 160 360 2.25
11001010101001010001 1000000001000 1000000001000 0.1249 0.1249 0.00 160 370 2.31
10001011111101010101 1000000001001 1000000001001 0.1322 0.1322 0.00 140 360 2.57
11010100110111000110 1000010000010 1000010000010 0.0875 0.0875 0.00 190 370 1.95
10001011010010001000 1000000001011 1000000001011 0.1274 0.1274 0.00 160 360 2.25
00111100010011010111 0000000110000 0000000110000 0.0982 0.0982 0.00 150 350 2.33
10111110101000110101 1000000001001 1000000001001 0.1252 0.1252 0.00 160 360 2.25
01111111011010110001 0000000011000 0000000011000 0.1275 0.1275 0.00 170 350 2.06
10111111101100111001 1000000001001 1000000001001 0.1252 0.1252 0.00 160 360 2.25
01101001111000001101 1000000001001 1000000001001 0.1322 0.1322 0.00 160 350 2.19
10100000110011011111 1000000001011 1000000001011 0.1274 0.1274 0.00 140 370 2.64
10000001110100000110 1000010001000 1000010001000 0.0816 0.0816 0.00 190 360 1.89
01000111101101001000 1000000001001 1000000001001 0.1252 0.1252 0.00 170 360 2.12
00110101010000000101 0000010001000 0000010001000 0.0684 0.0684 0.00 160 370 2.31
11100100101000010110 1000000001001 1000000001001 0.1252 0.1252 0.00 150 370 2.47
00010111011111101101 0000000001011 0000000001011 0.1442 0.1442 0.00 180 350 1.94
01001110100100000110 1000010000010 1000010000010 0.0611 0.0611 0.00 170 350 2.06
01000011110111100100 0000000110000 1000010001010 0.0982 0.0966 1.72 170 370 2.18
10111101011111001101 1000000001011 1000000001011 0.1470 0.1470 0.00 150 360 2.40
10001010011111010000 0000000011000 0000000011000 0.1275 0.1275 0.00 150 370 2.47
10001101101011110000 0000000011000 0000000011000 0.1275 0.1275 0.00 160 370 2.31
GA specifications
Population size 100
Elitist/inherited 40%
Population
Crossover rate 0.85
Crossover point Mid-point (fixed)
Mutation rate 0.01
Stopping criteria 50 stable generations
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based approach also affected the performance of the
algorithm. We analyzed different population sizes
along with the problem size to demonstrate that
relatively small population sizes result in an
effective GA performance. Fig. 1 demonstrates the
accuracy of the GA-based approach compared to
the optimal solution obtained by the BF search of
the security technologies and vulnerabilities. The
error rate as compared with the optimal solution
appears on the y axis and the problem size appears
on the x axis.
From Fig. 1, it can be seen that the GA-based
approach has error levels of less than 5% with
Table 5
Security profiles for selected vulnerabilities
Vulnerability profile Vulnerabilities Security profile Security technologies
00001011011100010101 Homogeneity, Predictability, Rigidity,
Gullibility, Capacity Limits, Lack of
Recoverability, Electronic Accessibility,
Physical Accessibility, Dependency
0000000101000 Segmentation, Decentralization
and Quarantine, Self-organization
and Collective behavior
01111110011101011110 Singularity, Centralization, Separability,
Homogeneity, Sensitivity, Predictability,
Gullibility, Capacity Limits, Lack of
Recoverability, Difficulty of Management,
Electronic Accessibility, Transparency,
Physical Accessibility, Electromagnetic
Susceptibility
1000000001001 Heterogeneity, Self-organization
and Collective behavior, Threat/
Warning Response Structure
10001101101011110000 Uniqueness, Separability, Homogeneity,
Predictability, Rigidity, Gullibility, Lack
of Recoverability, Lack of Self-awareness,
Difficulty of Management, Complacency/
Co-optability
0000000011000 Immunologic Identification,
Self-organization and Collective
behavior
01001110100100000110 Singularity, Homogeneity, Sensitivity,
Predictability, Malleability, Lack of
Recoverability, Physical Accessibility,
Electromagnetic Susceptibility
1000010000010 Heterogeneity, Rapid Recovery
and Reconstitution, Centralized
Management of Information
Resources
Fig. 1. GA accuracy for varying problem sizes.
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of 24 vulnerabilities and 24 security technologies.
The GA-based approach accuracy suffered for larger
problems when, for example, the population size of
20 or 50 security profiles was used for each
generation. However, a population of 50 security
profiles represents only 0.0002% of all the possible
security profiles. We can easily see that GA-based
approach is accurate for population sizes above 100
security profiles. In instances when the GA-based
technique does not provide the optimal solution, the
error is low enough for the solution to be considered
to be a viable solution. It has to be noticed that given
the complex nature of information security technol-
ogies, even the optimal solutions do not guarantee a
complete coverage of all vulnerabilities. However,
such a solution provides an approach to manage the
risk of exposure while keeping the costs under
control. From a management perspective, such an
approach provides insight into viable security sol-
utions and generates an awareness of the exposed
risk that management can further address through
disaster recovery measures.
Nevertheless, the question still remains: Is the
GA-based approach fast enough for larger problems
with a bigger population size? Fig. 2 presents the
performance of the GA-based approach as the
problem size increases. From Fig. 2, it is evident
that the BF approach performs better for smaller
problem sizes. However, the execution time of the
BF approach increases exponentially with the prob-
lem size. For larger problem sizes, the GA-based
approach performs several thousand times faster than
the BF approach. It is also interesting to see that the
execution time for GAs does not increase exponen-
tially with an increase in the population size.
7. Conclusions and future directions
In this research, we presented a GA-based
approach to allow organizations to match their
security technologies against their vulnerabilities.
Matching security technologies and vulnerabilities is
a dual-objective problem: maximizing the vulnerabil-
ities covered and minimizing the security costs. The
problem was reduced to a set-covering problem,
known not to be solvable in polynomial time.
Therefore, a heuristic approach using GAs was used.
We used a weighted average GA approach to
combine the objective functions and find a good
security match to the vulnerabilities while trying to
minimize the security cost. The GA-based approach
was much faster than the BF approach of searching
Fig. 2. GA execution time.
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algorithm scales very well with the problem size
and the execution time increases almost linearly
with the increase in the problem size (search space),
i.e., the increase in the number of vulnerabilities and
security technologies. The GA-based approach also
showed acceptable levels of accuracy in determining
the correct solution.
In future research, this mapping can easily be
extended to match securities to vulnerabilities with
specific implementations of vulnerabilities and
security technologies. Carrying out case studies in
organizations and applying the techniques described
in this paper would truly demonstrate and hope-
fully underscore the practicality and usefulness of
the approach. The implementation of the GA used
here can be refined and extended to improve
performance and scalability of the approach, as
well as compared against other heuristics to further
measure performance. Eventually, we envision this
GA-based approach being incorporated into a
decision support tool for supporting managers in
information security planning and management
activities. Finally, much more research in general
needs to be done to assist organizations in
protecting their informational assets from harm at
an acceptable cost.
Appendix A. Pseudo-code for genetic algorithm
Procedure reproduce
Input: cur_pop: a vector of solution population
mid: the position at which crossover take place
mutate_prob: mutation probability
Output: next_pop: a vector of the same size as the
input pop.
Begin:
sort cur_pop according to the solution fitness in
descending order
inherit a percentage of best performing solutions
to the next_pop
while next_pop.sizebcur_pop.size(), do
copy two solutions, s1, s2, from the cur_pop.
//The chance for each solution getting picked
is proportional to its fitness.
if (crossover_prob)
call crossover(s1, s2, mid)
mutate s1, s2, according to mutate_prob
insert s1, s2 in next_pop
increment next_pop by 2
end loop
End
Procedure crossover
Input:s1, s2: parent strings
mid: the position at which crossover take place
Output: none
Begin:
exchange the bits from 0 to mid between s1 and
s2.
End
Procedure GA
Input:
Output:
Begin:
call Generate_initial_population(pop)
old_best=0;
for ib0 to max_generation, do
best=Compute_fitness(pop);
if old_best!=best
old_best=best;
ctr=0;
else
ctr++;
if ctrNstable
return best;
end if
end if
next_pop=reproduce(pop);
pop=next_pop;
end loop
End
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